[C]ertain legal problems are "common" because they raise crossborder issues, such as settlement of water disputes or pollution between countries. One might also talk of "common" legal problems where the judiciary of one country might learn from the experience of another country's courts and their special techniques. France, for example, recently introduced a class action device, and it obviously and intelligently looked to comparative models. 6 Indeed there is significant academic discussion of the concept of policy transfer or diffusion. ' The matter is extremely complex. Consider as one example the American approaches towards regulatory impact analysis (RIA) requiring cost-benefit analysis before the promulgation of regulations. There is substantial evidence that the EU has recently developed similar cost-benefit approaches.
8 Are these parallel developments?
Do they reflect policy transfer? Can there be diffusion without convergence? 9 There can be little doubt that European academics, if not Brussels bureaucrats, were aware of American developments. Whether there was a causal connection is unclear.
But none of this has anything to do with causal relationships or indeed with the underlying connection between administrative law and a nation's jurisprudential ethos. 6 Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POL 'Y REV. 33, 40 (June & July, 2005) 'L EcoN. L. 473,486-495 (2005) . Recently, OJRA administrator John Graham, after "comparing notes" with European Commission officials wrote, "I was amazed at how serious the EU has become about regulatory reform." John D. 'Y 924 (2005) .
II. American Administrative Law
In my view, administrative law depends in huge measure on the jurisprudential culture of individual jurisdictions-what Baron Montesquieu so quaintly called, "The Spirit of the Laws." 1 Thus, for example, much of continental Europe has instinctively accepted "as inescapable"" and "unstoppable"' 2 Max Weber's paradigm classifying bureaucracy as an expression of high rationality in government administration.
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And for many in continental Europe such rationality in government was seen as far preferable to the vicissitudes of a potentate or the variability of vox populi.
For example, this is the case in France, where-in contrast to the US-"members of the Public... are much more likely to hold a hierarchical world view" leaving them more confident in the expertise of administrators and technocrats 4 and more ready to defer to their judgments on regulatory policy. 5 This deference to experts leads to the view that bureaucracy is good and that a centralized state is the natural approach to organizing society. (Peter Lassman & Ronald Spears eds., 1994) (describing bureaucrats as "always and increasingly a person with professional training and a specialization").
Consider the story-likely apocryphal-of "the French Minister of Education looking at his watch at three o'clock on a Monday afternoon and saying to a visitor: 'At this moment pupils in year five of every French school will be studying Racine. "' 7 Accomplishing that degree of centralization takes a great deal of regulation.
For a short period of time from around the 1880s through the New Deal there was a strand of American thought that was similarly approving of bureaucracy. It was the age of science, of reverence towards experts and expertise. There was a belief as Woodrow Wilson put it, in the "science of administration, "' 8 that politics could be divorced from governing. Wilson, I should note, held these views while a college professor. As candidate for President, he adopted a more skeptical view of what the British call "boffins. "' 19 Communities ( J. 343, 343, 345-348 (1968 ScI. Q. 197, 209-210 (1887) . 19 In a Labor Day Speech, while campaigning in New York, Wilson exhorted:
What I fear, therefore, is a government of experts. God forbid that in a democratic country we should resign the task and give the government over to experts. What are we for if we are to be [scientifically] taken care of by a small number of gentlemen who are the only men who understand the job? Because if we don't understand the job, then wve are not a free people. We ought to resign our free institutions and go to school to somebody and find out what it is we are about. This belief in administration as a science and expertise as the saving grace of governance flourished well into the New Deal. 20 According to this perspective, when government perceives a problem it appoints a commission or agency to regulate or manage the problem. The entire field, so to speak, should be left to the agency's expert judgment of how, when, and in what way to fill in the regulatory canvass. This perspective has been carried on by jurists like Justice Stevens with his penchant that "broad discretion" be afforded agencies to "meet new and unanticipated problems." 21 We should note, however, that Stevens wrote in dissent, and that the staying power of such regulatory maximalism is clearly contested within the Court and the legislature.
This undercurrent of American history is dwarfed by a fundamental continuum of American political thought-Americans distrust bureaucracy. This "deep uneasiness," as James Freedman has put it, "about the coercive and dehumanizing influence of bureaucratic organizations" 23 has a number of sources. One reason is the belief that bureaucracies "too often appear concerned primarily with formalistic adherence to their own rules, rather than with seeking a personalized response to the peculiarities of [the individual's] specific circumstances. 2 4 This concern that the letter of the law often undercuts its "spirit" is well described in Philip Howard's best seller, The Death of Common Sense.
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Howard argues that while "we don't trust bureaucrats," giving them discretion is "the only way for them to do anything, and the only way for us to know who to blame." 26 Thus, he wants to give bureaucrats flexibility to waive rules or not to waive rules, to accept individuated compliance solutions; in short, to ignore the letter of the law to accomplish its "spirit. '27 Ironically, Howard's remedy for pervasive over-and under-inclusiveness in regulatory enforcement is to empower bureaucrats by giving them even more responsibility (or in administrative law terms more discretion) to take 20 Some have argued that we are now at a kind of "constitutional moment," to borrow from Bruce Ackerman, 37 where American politics defaults to market-based solutions and where the proponents of regulation have, as it were, the burden both of production and of proof."
A third source of American skepticism of federal bureaucracy comes from our belief in subsidiarity, or in our constitutional terminology, federalism. The French view that every classroom in the country should have the same teaching schedule has historically not set well with Americans. Some areas are constitutionally left to the states to regulate, and thus federal bureaucracy is structurally limited as to its range of activity.
Some commentators (usually academics) have proposed new approaches to government intervention based on informal approaches to regulatory management. These initiatives, variously termed "democratic experimentalism," 39 cooperative 247, 270-271 (1998) . The technocratic approach proposes "rationality" techniques to improve the regulatory process. The goal of the reactionary approach "was to stall or eliminate regulation whatever its content-largely with procedural requirements so extensive as to prevent agencies from doing much at all." Id. at 271. REv. 155, 169 (2000) , who urges that, through contracting, many government agencies rely on "a private work force to assist them in implementing laws and regulations," including the provision of services and execution of daily functions. 
III. Attempts to Meet the Challenge of the Quest for Legitimacy
This quest for legitimacy has led theorists ofAmerican administrative law to undertake four interrelated projects. I will call them the Accountability Project, the Rationality Project, the Transparency Project, and the Participatory Project. Each is an effort to address the problem of democratic legitimacy by appealing to a kind of faux legitimacy--one which reflects a rough substitute for the democratic process.
As the limits of one project becomes clear, another comes to the fore. At any one moment in time, therefore, administrative law may contain all these efforts. As Gerald Frug has noted (in regard to a comparable classification), "each model has not simply replaced its predecessor. Instead, each has been added to the others, so that in the end all of them have become part of legal discourse";
5 " yet none fully succeed, nor can they. For the price one pays for rejecting the technological paradigm is that you must rely on a "populist" or democratic paradigm to secure legitimacy in the administrative state. But when you talk about democratic legitimacy and the administrative state, you talk about a circle that cannot easily be squared.
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 469 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (citing Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245 , 2253 -54 (2001 ), asserts that the various models of the administrative state "did not so much succeed each other as 'bleed into each other." ' Kagan cites Frug for the premise that the models for mechanisms to approximate democratic legitimacy intermingled chronologically. Id. Bressman goes further, imposing this concept on the models themselves. I do not accept this last formulation, but rather suggest that the models co-exist, independently, within the "legal discourse." See Bressman, BeyondAccountability at 469.
The Accountability Project reflects the effort of the Anglo-American common law since the Middle Ages to constrain executive authority undertaken beyond the limits of the law. Its principles were developed in the famous 171 century litigation, styled Dr. Bonham s Case, 51 which discussed judicial review of executive decisions.
The Rationality Project emerged after World War II and attempted to constrain the administrative state by requiring that it act in a rational manner. The reality that, in the modem world, more and more power was being delegated to administrative agencies raises obvious problems in democratic accountability. One way to make up for the accountability deficit was to demand that the courts protect the rationality of agency decision-making. To put it otherwise, if we are not able to provide democratic accountability through the electoral process, we can create virtual accountability by demanding rationality (the presumption perhaps being that the popular will and the rational thing to do will be in some measure congruent).
The Transparency Project is a post World War II approach that uses transparency --openness in government-as another method of ensuring legitimacy. Transparency is seen as a substitute for accountability. The theory is that if the public is aware of government actions, as well as the reasons for and background behind those actions, the government will be likely to make certain its actions are more closely in accord with the public will. Thus it is thought that transparency would provide a methodology that provides virtual democratic legitimacy.
The Participatory Project was an effort to increase public participation in the administrative rulemaking process. It was believed that such participation would increase the legitimacy of the rulemaking process by serving a functional substitute for the fact that bureaucrats are not properly elected.
A. The Accountability Project
The historic project of the English common law judges was to claim jurisdiction over executive action and to regulate when the executive acted outside the powers given Sometimes the question of whether the executive acted beyond the powers afforded him by statute is easy. The statute says do X; the executive should be ordered to do X.
However, this is true only when X is a simple ministerial act, e.g., when the river reaches 10 feet high on a flood marker, open the sluice gates to relieve the pressure on the dam. Here, there is very little discretion involved in the ascertainment of whether the river is 10ft high. The act is ministerial. If the executive fails to follow that statutory directive he can be ordered to do so by a court under a writ of mandamus.
practice unlicensed by the board. For this unlicensed practice, he was imprisoned for seven days for contempt of the board. Consequently, Bonham brought an action for false imprisonment against the board members. By that tort action, he sought to gain judicial review of the propriety of the board's action against him. The Court of Common Pleas took the case. In his opinion for the court, Lord Coke found that the licensing board's determination that Bonham was "insufficient and inexpert in the art of medicine" was reviewable. the Secretary of the Navy to pay her two pensions--one under a general pension law and the other under a special act of Congress passed for her alone. The Court held that the Secretary's decision not to pay the second pension was "discretionary," not "ministerial," because he had to decide (1) whether to reverse a predecessor's decision on the subject, (2) how half-pay should be calculated, and (3) whether there was enough money in the pension fund to satisfy all claims. The Court's attitude is well expressed in its statement that the "interference of the Courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that such a power was never intended to be given to them." 59 Thus the principles of Decatur left little range for judicial review as it made almost all executive conduct "discretionary."
Even up until 1900, the Court held that "courts have no general supervising power over the proceedings and action of the various administrative departments of the government. ' "60 However, institutional changes were afoot that would soon affect L. REv. 197,244 (1991 legal doctrine. In the second half of the 191 h Century, the national government faced the challenge of regulating economic monopolies, or oligopolies-in particular the railroads, which were "a central, if not the major, element in the political, economic, and social development of the United States."'" The administrative commission form of regulation had earlier been employed in Britain 62 and at the state level in the United
States. 6 3 The statutory creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 was the natural derivation of these experiments. With the advent of national regulation, the courts began to examine the powers of administrative entities, 64 although the presumption of unreviewability was not reversed until the Supreme Court's 1902 decision in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty. 6 5 In that case, the Supreme Court found that the presumption was not applicable even though Congress had not spoken to the question of judicial review. The Court stated that where an official makes a mistake of law and acts outside the limits of his authority, "the courts.., must have power in a proper proceeding to grant relief. Otherwise, the individual is left to the absolutely uncontrolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law and is in violation of the rights of the individual.
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Since Magnetic Healing, we live in a world that presumes judicial review of administrative action. In large measure, that is because the discipline judicial 44-52 (1992 Thus, the central theoretical issue for administrative law in the 20th century has been the drive to curtail agency discretion both through formalized adjudication procedures and judicial review. This fear of empowering bureaucrats with flexibility reflects a traditional concern that the administrative state, if unchecked, would likely act arbitrarily and capriciously.
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The so-called "bible" of administrative procedure-the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act or APA 6 9 --tells us that courts should preclude judicial review only where specifically precluded by statute or when an action is committed to agency discretion by law and therefore is an action not amenable to review. 70 Courts also read statutes that preclude judicial review exceedingly narrowly. 7 Thus, when a statute said that senior citizens cannot appeal a medical benefit determination, courts have determined that the ban may apply to individual benefits but not to an attack on the methodology used to determine awards. 72 And similarly, when a statute did not allow for judicial review of veterans' educational benefits, courts have found that the preclusion does not apply to a constitutional claim regarding that benefit system before a federal court.
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The Supreme Court has even taught that it would be unconstitutional to preclude judicial review of a constitutional claim. In a highly unusual case concerning the hiring practices of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Court struggled with the question of whether there were situations in which constitutional claims can be forbidden judicial REV. 1657, 1658-59 (2004) [hereinafter Bressman, Judicial Review] , argues that it is "erroneous" to believe that "the constitutional structure is committed foremost to promoting political accountability." I disagree. While there are certainly other important principles supported by our constitutional structure, democratic legitimacy is historically and necessarily the primary area of concern. 6 Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 423, 434 (1996) . See also the classic American study on the structuring of discretion K.C. DAvis, 55-68, 111,226-27 (1969) , urging different methods of structuring discretionary power, particularly more extensive use of rule making and increased openness in informal processes, in order to combat arbitrariness. Even when Congress decided that visa revocation decisions are insulated from judicial review" federal courts, consistent with the "strong presumption for judicial review," have managed to carve out a place for themselves. They have done so by either narrowly interpreting statutory grants of discretion, 79 or by determining that provisions of the Immigration Act provided the Attorney General with objective legal criteria to use in his decision and thus did not give him unfettered discretion." This ' Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592(1988) , concerned a man discharged from the CIA after he voluntarily revealed that he was a homosexual, since the agency viewed his sexual preference as a security risk. Since the Director of the CIA had statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, Doe's discharge depended on the subjective judgment of the director and there was no law to apply. In contrast, the recent case of is not subject to judicial review because the BLM was given by statute a great deal of discretion in deciding how to implement its mandate.
The court found that the kind of agency action (or failure to act) properly reviewable under the APA was "properly understood to be limited... to a discrete action."1s6 And the Court made clear that " [t] he prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace of agency compliance with such congressional directives is not contemplated by the APA. ' 8 7 Some commentators have suggested that the Norton court's "analysis cuts against the logic of modern administrative law," 88 specifically the broad presumption ofjudicial review. Whether that presumption has reached its apogee remains to be seen. Indeed, it may well be that increased executive control of the agency rulemaking process and more vigorous congressional oversight (discussed below) may be replacing, in part, the accountability function of judicial review. But to the extent to which we have reached the limits of the accountability project through the courts, I believe it is because the courts cannot themselves solve the legitimacy problem.
I should make clear that the presumption of review has no analytical connection to the question of standing. While there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court, starting in the 1960's, relaxed standing requirements with the result of increasing access to courts, the Court has clearly begun to "right" itself, recognizing that there are both constitutional limitations in standing as well as prudential concerns limiting who can sue. The Constitution's Article III constraint constitutes a requirement that there actually be a case or controversy, thus requiring that the plaintiff have a concrete injury.
89 The Constitution's Article II concerns make clear that decisions whether or not to enforce statutes is an executive function not a private sector decision.
B. The Rationality Project
Another important feature of American administrative law is its focus on rationality as a justification for agency action. Indeed, as Jerry Mashaw suggests, reason is "an exclusive ground for legitimacy" in administrative law. 91 And the "force of reason" 92 matters in administrative law specifically because the administrative process lacks the legitimacy of the legislative process. Over a quarter of a century ago, in National ' 93 This emphasis on rationality is underscored by the judicial articulation of the notice and comment requirement for APA informal rulemaking 94 and in the various White House mandates for cost benefit studies prior to issuing "major" regulations. 95 As
Peter Strauss has underscored:
[r]equirements of rulemaking "rationality" thus serve to impose practical bounds on agency judgment that do not exist for legislatures; Congress can with impunity amend a statute in selfcontradictory ways, but an agency trying to "have it both ways" will likely fail the judicial test of rationality. From a perspective that puts a high value on the place of reason in even political discourse among citizens, this virtue might be thought to counterbalance the missing discipline of the ballot box.
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The concept of informal rulemaking is a unique American contribution to administrative law, one that promotes the rationality project. Indeed, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis called it "one of the greatest inventions of modem government."
One author has suggested that, "the paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy-informal rulemaking-is specifically geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory." lawmaking." 99 And such "deliberative rulemaking" is central to the rationality project.
It must be acknowledged that the "notice and comment" experiment cannot be revered as a total panacea. There is strong evidence that, in many cases, the notice and comment process is used more by regulated interests than the public.' 0 This
should not surprise us as it is unlikely that institutional arrangements can, on their own, negate economic realities. Nonetheless, the "notice and comment" requirements do partake in the rationality project.
Section 553 of the APA requires that all new regulations be published as proposed regulations, that time be afforded for citizen comment, and that the agency respond to and reflect the comments in the final rule which should be accompanied by a concise statement of basis and purpose incorporating those comments. So far, so good. The remarkable feature of this so-called "notice-and-comment" rulemaking is that the public has a chance to comment on the rules before they are finalized. This contributes to rationality by obliging the agency to respond to citizen comments and to justify its approach. By bringing the interests of commentators into the conversation, prepromulgation comments provide agencies an opportunity to gain data that can improve the regulatory process, thus contributing to more "rational" regulation. But there is more. Courts have required that agencies respond meaningfully to citizens' comments when preparing the final regulation. 1 1 They have further determined to take a "hard look"' 0 2 at the final rule, looking to see if the agency used incorrect statutory factors or failed to use correct factors in drafting the rule. Most importantly, the agency must give a "reasonable explanation" for making the decision it did. Furthermore, the record on which the agency acted must be available to the public so that we can all test the reasonableness of agency action. Thus the agency must show that it did not act "irrationally," or to use the technical locution, in an "arbitrary and capricious manner."' 0 3
By requiring agencies to give reasons, and courts to provide in depth review of those reasons, the notice and comment rulemaking process serves to promote rationality. . 1041 should note that some commentators have suggested that "notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions-a highly stylized process Rational analysis, of course, requires knowledge. Thus the Clinton administration, through Executive Order 12,866,0 required all rulemaking agencies to "prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or review."'" This list requires agencies to coordinate the President's regulatory agenda. But it also forces agencies to list (and prioritize) their proposed regulatory actions. Such a planning requirement assists in developing rational analysis for the administrative state.
Another example of the rationality project is the increased use of cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking. The premise of this position is simple: it is unreasonable -indeed it is irrational-to promulgate a rule in which the costs are greater than the benefits. The argument is variously stated that Congress could not have meant to authorize an agency to act so irrationally, or at least that we can presume that Congress did not so intend, unless it makes a "clear statement" that that is its goal. Of course, the problem is that Congress has on many occasions acted to require regulations without seeming reference to costs. At one point, the Senate passed proposed legislation which required cost-benefit analysis as a precondition of agency rulemaking "except where the enabling statute pursuant to which the agency is acting directs otherwise. "' 7 Grants of statutory power to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as example, to protect worker safety are not limited by the cost-benefit calculus." 0 ' Neither are many of our anti-pollution laws." 0 9
In recent years an effort was made by some jurists (most notably in the D.C. Circuit) to develop the notion that the default position in administrative law is one where benefits must exceed costs; that is to say, some form of cost-benefit analysis is the governing rule of reasonableness unless the statute chooses another rule." 0 for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 28, 2002) . In this order, President Bush eliminates the role of the Vice-President from the regulatory review process. function. 116 One manifestation of this is the unprecedented use of "prompt letters,"
proactive directives from OIRA "suggesting that an agency explore a promising regulatory issue for agency action, accelerate its efforts on an ongoing regulatory matter, or consider rescinding or modifying an existing rule."" ' 7 As of May 12, 2005, twelve prompt letters had been issued." 8 For its part, Congress has long debated the use of "cost-benefit analysis" in regulatory reform."
9 While it has not instituted it generally, it has required its use in a number of circumstances including the "Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. "' 20 This is a statute that affects agencies that promulgate regulations creating federal spending requirements for the states. Such agencies must provide a "qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits" of such federal mandates when they result in an aggregated expenditure of 100 million dollars (indexed for inflation). '12 The effort to ensure that the chosen regulatory approach "maximizes net benefits"' 2 2
has led to the development of risk analysis, including a developing variant, riskrisk analysis. Risk-risk analysis suggests that in determining costs, one has to look not only at the risks of not acting, but also the risks of promulgating a government regulation. These difficulties aside, the cost-benefit principle is an effort to make the regulatory process more subject to rational analysis. It is part of the rationality project-an effort to make "reason" a shadow substitute for democratic legitimacy. 
C. The Transparency Project
Until recently, the prevailing theory in England was that you needed a reason to receive information about what the government does. 128 The presumption in America protection of human health and the environment" and an "outline how RTA should be incorporated into decisionmaking about medical treatment and government regulation (including legislative, administrative, and judicial functions.)" See also arguing that properly conceived the principle "is sufficiently accurate in tracking overall wellbeing and has sufficient other procedural virtues-it is relatively cheap to implement, relatively easy to monitor by oversight bodies, and relatively undemanding of agency expertise"). 127 We should note the cautionary note of Colin Diver that "[t]he leading metaphor for comprehensive rationality is not the spirited debate of the town meeting but the scientist's lonely search for truth." Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 425 (1981) . 128 Change came with passage of the Freedom of Information Act, 2000, ch. 36 (Eng.). The United Kingdom's legislation is more limited in scope than the United States' Freedom of Information Act for two reasons. The first is that "a public authority [may] refuse a request for example because further information is required to enable it to comply (... ); the cost of compliance would exceed 'the appropriate limit' (...); the request is 'vexatious' or is a repeated request for the same information is exactly the opposite. Any person can request information and, generally speaking, does not have to show any specific need for the requested information. Indeed, the government needs a reason for not letting citizens have information. Such reasons are linked to specific statutory exemptions, which must be construed strictly. 12 9 Starting in the 1960's, Congress passed a variety of laws designed to promote transparency in government. These include the Freedom of Information Act, 3 ' the Federal Advisory Committee Act,"' and the Government in the Sunshine Act.' Such laws serve "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed. "' 33 Transparency, then, would promote accountability and provide another support for legitimacy. For as James Madison noted in 1821, "[a] popular Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.""M There can be no doubt that the task of maintaining openness by both government and regulated entities has become far easier in the computer age. ' 35 Using what has been described as "E-Government,"' 36 vast strides have been made in placing REv. 991, 1011 REv. 991, -13 (1994 .
6 E-government includes: e-publication, which is "by far the most important and widespread government use" involving "dissemination or 'publication' of information;" e-filing or "online filing of official documents, such as tax returns, corporate and non-profit filings, security interest filings...;" and e-procurement, or "government use of the Internet for buying and selling goods and services." See John C. Given that computer files are clearly "documents" under the Freedom of Information Act, 39 the prospect of widening the ambit of government disclosure inexpensively becomes a real possibility. Furthermore, the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 199614 created "electronic reading rooms" '' that offer extensive information to the public. The idea is that there is no point in requiring agencies allow interested parties to comment on proposed regulations without giving them the necessary data to make informed comments. This raises transparency to a new level.
Further, as electronic filing becomes more prevalent, affirmative dissemination of documents becomes easier. Now, "any person can obtain the records, leaving no paper trail to indicate that records on a subject had been downloaded by anyone."142 Thus, ease of access improves. Indeed, it is now possible to use hypertext to link files and documents that would affirmatively provide citizens with records of proposed government action allowing for a kind of affirmative transparency. In fact, courts have used this transparency concept to require full and robust "records" in rulemaking Transparency can even serve as an alternative to regulation. Under appropriate circumstances, an agency may avoid direct regulation of regulated entities by requiring them to provide information to the general public. Often the informed public is able to exert sufficient influence on the regulated community to alleviate the need for further administrative activity. We can see this clearly in statutes like the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.'" For example, that Act requires companies to share information about hazardous materials. Often providing information to the public is all that is needed to influence the behavior of the regulated community.
The underlying theory is that if citizens have the facts they will be better able to make rational choices. If consumers know, for instance, that certain foods are genetically modified, they may not choose to purchase them, thus affecting business behavior. Similarly, notices placed on cigarettes warning of the risks of cancer will presumably reduce the incidence of smoking by affecting consumer behavior. Such government required transparency, it is hoped, will inform public opinion in ways that will mimic the rational voter, thus creating a democratic shadow orfaux legitimacy for the administrative enterprise.
While the impetus for transparency has stalled somewhat after the tragedy of 9/11, 145 the resulting war on terror, and the concomitant concerns for the protection of critical-infrastructure, the thrust remains: a recognition that transparency in bureaucracy resolves, in part, the administrative state's legitimacy problem."6
D. The Participatory Project
The Participatory Project was an effort to increase public participation in the administrative rulemaking process.' 47 It was believed that such participation would increase the legitimacy of the rulemaking process by serving as a functional substitute for elected legislatures-thus solving the "democratic deficit" of administrative law.'
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And as one proponent of interest-group participation has concluded, "[a]gency decisions made after adequate consideration of all affected interests.. .have... legitimacy based on the same principle as legislation. "' 49 This approach "drew force from a general social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical 'experts' administering a strictly rational process, and more as political bodies making choices among alternatives in response to social needs and political inputs. "' 50 The revolution in participation was not a single, coherent movement. It included many disparate initiatives with widely variable effects. However, the driving force of the revolution was a lack of faith in the ability of established governmental institutions to understand the popular will and respond appropriately; again, a crisis of legitimacy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the American people experienced a transformative struggle for civil rights, unsatisfactorily explained assassinations of revered public figures, an unpopular war, political scandals, and a growing disaffection with government, which appeared unable to accomplish ambitious social objectives. 5 ' The motives of those seeking to expand public participation ranged from a near-paranoid mistrust of the government's own motives, to a populist belief that direct input from citizens would improve the quality of the government's decisions. Also prominent was a faith in participation as a means of empowering and involving the disenfranchised and unrepresented which "to its defenders" reflected "a quest to expand the meaning and practice of freedom." 1 5 2 Participation in the rulemaking process is guaranteed by the APA's notice-and-comment provisions for informal rulemaking. 5 3 Specifically, an agency must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking with a draft rule and leave the record open for public comment. ' The final rule must take these comments into account and agencies must explain in a "concise statement of basis and purpose" accompanying the final rule exactly how they responded to public comments.
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As one court has suggested, these requirements are "intended to insure that the process of legislative rule-making in administrative agencies is infused with openness, explanation, and participatory democracy." ' 156 In its heyday, the participation project led to a lowering of barriers of access to the courts' 57 and to intervention in agency proceedings. 58 For a time, courts required various forms ofjudicially imposed public hearings crafted to meet a supersized notice and comment requirement in informal rulemaking. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court slapped down those efforts, precluding judicially created duties beyond those called for in the APA or enabling statute."' They made clear that courts could not promote participation beyond that provided by statute. "' 54 The APA does not tell us how long the public gets to comment. For a discussion of enabling statutes that contain time periods see JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENcV RULEMAKING, 278-80, 296-98 (4th ed. 2006 ). E.O. 12,866, states that the period should "in most cases" be not less than 60 days, however that recommendation is not judicially enforceable. Exec. Order No. 12,866 Sec. 6(a)(1-2)(3) C.F.R. 644 (1993) reprinted as amended in Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9384 (Feb. 28, 2002) . (2002), "Agencies engaged in informal rulemaking may provide additional procedures beyond those established by the APA, other applicable statutes, and the agencies' own rules, but courts may not require them to do so." " Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524, 544-49 (1978) .
Moreover a number of recent participatory "project" efforts have excited democracy theorists, although the jury is still out as to their actual effect in promoting civic participation in the administrative process. One such technique is "negotiated rulemaking," by which the agency invites key "stakeholders" to sit at the E-Rulemaking Initiative, 6 2 spurred by the E-Government Act of 2002163 and the development of the Federal Docket Management System, 164 a centralized federal system designed to spur citizen access to the rulemaking process. The centerpiece of this effort, Regulation.gov, is designed to assist citizens to locate and submit electronic documents on proposed agency regulation. 165 Democracy theorists have begun to speculate how participatory models can be used in administrative law. Some have drawn from the deliberative democracy proposals of democratic theorists, like Jim Fishkin, 166 to support a two-tier rulemaking system. Besides traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, the system would offer enhanced participation "involv[ing] a series of administrative jury deliberations (juries featuring stakeholders and members of the general public). "' 67 "The more public participation in the promulgation of an agency rule, the more deference that rule should receive when it is challenged in court. "' 68 However, scholars differ as to the potential success online systems enabling enhanced participation will achieve. While Orly Lobel has noted the potential of e-rulemaking to enhance legislative transparency by spawning "deliberative forums... (and) panels of citizens, like traditional juries, that would advise about rulemaking,"' 69 not all commentators agree. For example, Beth Noveck argues that this heightened transparency will simply "increase the incentive for agencies and the public to 'work around' technological mechanisms and shift away from transparent toward less democratic, but more manageable models of back-room consultation." "' 7 Quoting from Dan Esty, Noveck further points out that "giving 'voice' to more people does not guarantee better policymaking. "' 71 For a time, legislatures stepped up to the plate, requiring (as in the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct) 7 agencies to pay the expenses of citizens to participate in hearings under the Act. 73 However, in recent years, the legislature's enthusiasm for maximum public participation has somewhat waned. We have seen, in Sidney Shapiro's words, efforts to "limit participation of interest groups representing regulatory beneficiaries.'
That comes, I suggest, from a recognition that participation and especially maximal possible participation cannot solve the democratic deficit in administrative law. 233 (2004) . Further compounding the problem, "big interests are not only too much for the competitors but too much for the regulatory agencies as well. " Id. at 233. Indeed, one Italian scholar has underscored that "participation is more associated with good administration than democracy. "' 76 Academics may love the use of interest group representation in administrative decision making. Indeed, one of my Conference colleagues on this panel has proposed such a participatory (or interest based) approach to Israeli administrative law. 177 However, the interest representation approach can easily turn administrative agencies into venues for interest group pluralism. This is only a polite term for lobbying by special interests, thus introducing the problems of the legislative process into the executive branch. '78 For good or ill the pressure for participatory democracy that underlay the French street demonstrations of May 1968 and the American student movement of the 1970s has lost some but not all of its allure. And while the participatory project is no longer seen as conclusive proof of legitimacy in administrative law, it is important nonetheless.
179 That it has reached its apogee, however, reflects the problem of squaring the democratic impulse with the logic of the administrative state.
E. The Problem of Deference
How does the practice of deference fit into my argument that the American political system distrusts bureaucracy? By deference, of course, I mean the rigor by which as "a sharing of a nation's sovereign authority among its people" through political participation.).
courts review agency decisions (that is to say, decisions made by the bureaucracy). At first glance, theories of heightened deference appear to frustrate efforts to confront the "democratic deficit." However, I would argue to the contrary, that theories of heightened deference in fact contribute to resolving the challenge of the democratic deficit.
In the early years of the "administrative state," critics did not trust administrative agencies to follow "the rule of the law" and sought independent de novo review of agency determinations.
180 Over time, this distrust of the agency adjudication process ameliorated and we saw high levels of judicial deference to agency expertise. 8 overreaching" 88 in order to impose "new curbs on agency discretion." ' ' 9 The bill offered extensive, some say innumerable, opportunities for judicial review as a way of checking agency action. For example, it provided for review of the substance as well as the form of agency cost-benefit analyses and agency decisions to characterize rules as "major" or not.' 9 ' While the Congress undertook to limit deference through a series of failed legislative initiatives, the Court in 1984, in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, moved from "substitution of judgment" or "weak deference" in judicial review of legal question to a more permissive or deferential stance. Chevron 192 stated that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.1 9 3
Chevron soon became the "default" position for judicial review of administrative agency action. It "signified a fundamental paradigm-shift that redefined the rules of courts and agencies when construing statutes over which agencies have been given interpretive rights. "' 19 4 The gravamen of Chevron was to give "more policy discretion and law-making authority to administrative agencies, most of which are part of the after promulgation, id. at § 3 (a), and by enacting "look-back" provisions, by which a member of the regulated community can ask or require an agency to review the efficacy of a particular rule at any time, perhaps even when the rule is about to be enforced on that party. See id. at § 4 (a)(including a "look-back" provision as part of the proposed comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act). This ensures that the agency decision does not stray too far from contemporary congressional will. Further, the Dole bill not only allowed for more extensive judicial review of agency actions, it would also have required that proposed agency regulation be brought back to Congress and "laid on the specifically that some questions are too extraordinary to presume that Congress had delegated authority to the agency to make the policy call. This approach has been denominated the 'major question' exception to Chevron deference." 8 And indeed, in such cases (where deference is rejected), it has been argued that the Court was responding to a perception that the administration was acting in ways that while technically legal were viewed (by some) as undemocratic.
2 " 9 Or, as Bressman puts it, a condition of deference is "that an agency not only possess delegated authority but exercises such authority in a democratically reasonable fashion." 2 l
By locating authority in the president-the one official who speaks for all the people-the Chevron approach to statutory interpretation deftly avoids the legitimacy problem traditionally faced by administrative law. 21 ' 208 The "major question" exception is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 193 (2006) , where he asserts that through a "trilogy" of outlier cases (FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33, 159-61 (2000) ; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703-08 (1995); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228-34 (1994) ), the Court suggests the "possibility that deference will be reduced, or even nonexistent, if a fundamental issue is involved, one that goes to the heart of the regulatory scheme at issue. The apparent theory is that Congress should not be taken to have asked agencies to resolve those issues." For an alternative theory, see Lisa S. Bressman 211 There is, of course, another source of democratic legitimacy-the Congress. And one may wonder why one might not look to Congress as a way of avoiding the democratic deficit problem. Most scholars who support Chevron argue that democratic accountability is more likely to be found in the president than the Congress. The president is seen as having a national constituency and thus is more responsive than Congressmen to the electorate as a whole. See JERRY L. MsHAW, GREED, CHAos, AND GovERNANCE 152 (1997)(asserting that President is more responsive to public preferences because he deals with national issues and has no specific constituency negotiating benefits for votes). Supporters of presidential accountability tend to denigrate the congressional branch as a source of democratic accountability. Tracking recent application of "public choice theory" they argue "that the legislature will produce too few laws that serve truly public ends, and too many laws that serve private ends. REv. 275, 277 (1988) . Public choice theory, they would argue, "posits that legislatures fall prey to endless cycling and agenda manipulation in any voting scheme [and] suggests that, even under ideal circumstances and given the best intentions, Congress may be unable to arrive at constitutional decisions that are wholly consistent with the preferences of a majority of Congress' members preempts state lawsuits concerning the "duty to warn." The Bush interpretation had rejected an earlier 2000 Clinton administration interpretation of FIFRA allowing such suits. 218 Pierce is concemed that given the long time frame involved in effectuating statutory change, as well as in promulgating substantive regulations, "a newly-elected President with policy preferences that differ from those of his predecessor is unlikely to get most of his preferred policies approved by courts and in effect in his first term in office.1 2 1 9 He believes that positions put forward by a prior administration should not remain privileged during the first term of a newly-elected president.
Justice Scalia has argued that Chevron deference should be applied as long as the expression of an agency's interpretation is authoritative, regardless if that opinion has not been through the formal "notice and comment" process. Of course, the view that there should be little or no "drag" on the implementation of policy preferences put forth by a new administration conflicts directly with notions of rationality and expertise as lodestars for administrative behavior. While Chevron speaks to canons of statutory interpretation, not standards of judicial review, the majoritarian approach to Chevron regarding deference conflicts directly with the spirit of the so-called "hard look" doctrine of judicial review, It is in this light that one must consider the comments of critics of the "democratic" explication of Chevron, such as Thomas Merrill, who has argued that the decision reflects "a doctrine for Jacobeans: [that] the results of a single Presidential election are a sufficient cause for wholesale modifications in the law, with no offsetting incentive for stability or protection of reliance interests." ' 229 They have sought other explanations. One justification focused on the need to promote regulatory uniformity through a kind of interpretative Occam's Razor which allocated interpretative responsibility to the agency thus "enhanc[ing] the probability of uniform rational administration of the laws" rather than relaying on the diverse interpretations of 156 federal appellate judges and 12 circuit courts.
3° A second justification sought to resurrect the New Deal notion of experts, drawing on language in Chevron itself which states "that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position [than Congress] to do
SO.231
Today, however, we see a seeming retrenchment of Chevron or, at least, a "domestication" of the text's political reach.
2 32 This can be best seen in United States v. Mead 233 where the Court refocused the Chevron grundnorm on the requirement of congressional intent, generally ignoring the larger theoretical rationales reflected by and in the accountability "project" of administrative law. Thomas Merrill presaged this development as early as 1992, when he noted that "the failure of Chevron to perform as expected can be attributed to the Court's reluctance to embrace the draconian implications of the [Chevron] doctrine for the balance of power among the branches, and to practical problems generated by its all-or-nothing approach to the deference question.
34
On this view, we cannot presume that "accountability" empowers the executive branch to make interpretive judgments unless the legislative (with its own claims to democratic legitimacy) so approves. Therefore, "accountability" alone cannot fully resolve the challenge of the relationship between courts and agencies in the administrative state. Bressman argues that "the relationship between deference and democracy is more complicated than we have thought. ' 2 36 Indeed, she mounts a frontal assault on the view that legitimacy in administrative law derives from a successful effort to overcome administrative law's 'democratic deficit.' Instead, she argues that it is "erroneous" to believe that "the constitutional structure is committed foremost to promoting political accountability. '21 Rather, she argues that "political accountability alone does not adequately discipline the exercise of governmental lawmaking authority. ' 2 38 True legitimacy, she believes, comes from control of arbitrary government conduct though rule of law practices. 239 In her view, "'procedural formality also is necessary to guard against, among other things, even the 'authoritative' production of unfair, inconsistent, or arbitrary law. '2 4° Such "[p] rocedural formality, whether imposed under constitutional law or administrative law, always has been a necessary feature of governmental legitimacy.
241
This approach results in a different reading of Chevron and its progeny. Bressman would not justify Chevron s allocation of decisional power to agencies on the grounds that the executive branch (e.g. the president) represents electoral accountability. Rather, she would argue that Chevron deference is justified as a way for the judiciary to monitor against arbitrary behavior by agencies.
accountability," arguing instead that a "relationship to accountability, although not entirely absent, is a relatively minor aspect of the electoral process." 243 project is yet another effort to substitute for administrative law's democratic "deficit," not a rejection of the "deficit" problem. Bressman's approach, then, need not be inconsistent with the analysis in this paper. Indeed, there is a sense in which Bressman herself is not fully opposed to this view. Her "domesticated" understanding of Chevron would limit deference in situations where the executive branch acts in ways that do not reflect full and open democratic debate. Despite her best efforts, Bressman's focus remains on democratic legitimacy-she diverges only in that she seeks to achieve this end by concentrating solely on the rationality project, while dismissing the advantages of accountability, transparency, and participation. I would submit that it is perilous to ignore the benefits to be reaped from each of these approaches, as no one approach has demonstrated an ability to bring administrative law fully in step with the nation's traditional democratic principles (a fundamental part of our national identity). 243 See Rubin, supra note 239, at 2077. 244 See Fishkin, supra note 166. 245 See supra text accompanying notes 52-89. 246 See the U.S. Constitution, Article I.
IV. Conclusion
Where does all this leave us? The four projects discussed above all reflect the challenge of securing legitimacy for the American administrative process. All are efforts to provide some kind of substitute for the perceived democratic deficit in American administrative law. All can only provide partial recompense. Their almost dialectical process of rise and fall suggests that the "quest for a 'unified' theory of the administrative state," is illusory at best. 247 It is no surprise that, in Richard Stewart's words, "Administrative law will continue to be evolutionary and strongly conserving in character. The several existing forms and remedies will continue to be maintained, although their application may change, even as new ones are developed and added." ' 248 However nostalgic one might be for a more modest government sector, in the end, we must live with the modem administrative state. As Justice Breyer has noted, "to achieve our democratically chosen ends in a modem populous society requires some amount of administration, involving administrative, not democratic, decisionmaking. To achieve those same ends in a technologically advanced society requires expertise." ' 249 However, the 21" century will no doubt raise all sorts of new issues and innovations for administrative lawyers to consider, including issues as diverse as the role of government corporations; the role of public-private partnerships; the extension of government rules of process to private sector activities that have a large state regulatory context; the movement from command-and-control rules to performance rules; new efforts to bring arbitration and mediation into the administrative process; the proper treatment of informal adjudication; and new approaches to reinvigorating the arguably "ossified" rulemaking process. 247 Seidenfeld, supra note 178. Reuel Schiller argues that the "incoherence that has developed in administrative law" derives not from the legitimacy challenge but from "the decline of legal liberalism and the political ascendancy of a Republican party" reflecting "a laissez-faire. Antistatist ideology." Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945 -1970 , 53 VAND. L. REv. 1389 , 1451 -52 (2000 The central problem never changes. Whatever these innovations propose to do in terms of efficiency or equity they will need to address the problem of legitimacy. Countries like France and perhaps Israel, can appeal to the "technocratic" model. However, for Americans, the appeal to experts will not suffice and for that reason efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the American administrative state will continue to develop and evolve.
